Europe’s citizens have a direct stake in what happens next on the African continent. The terms on which European nations engage with Africa will shape trade flows, energy supply chains, migration pressures and the long-term economic security that underpins public services at home. Two of Europe’s largest economies, France and Italy, have now fundamentally recast their Africa strategies, and the choices they make carry consequences far beyond boardrooms or diplomatic summits.
The shift became visible in November 2025, when the G20 convened on African soil for the first time, a moment that underscored Africa’s rising weight as a global economic partner. That same period saw France and Italy launch ambitious new initiatives. Italy held its second Africa Summit in Addis Ababa in 2026, while France hosted its Africa Forward Summit in Nairobi, the first France-Africa summit co-organised with an African country outside France or Francophone Africa. These moves reflect a recognition that has spread across the continent. Since 2020, at least nine European countries have revised or substantially repositioned their Africa policies, acknowledging that the relationship must transcend the traditional model of Africa as a supplier of raw materials.
The competitive pressure driving this shift is real. China and the United Arab Emirates have spent the past decade building market share and deepening trade partnerships with African nations, steadily eroding the EU’s historically dominant position. European language has changed in response, with Brussels, Paris and Rome increasingly framing engagement through investment and partnership rather than aid. African governments are driving this change as much as external competition. African leaders are positioning themselves as equal partners, not aid recipients, and European capitals are adjusting their approach to match.
The numbers tell a sobering story about where Europe currently stands. While the EU remains Africa’s largest trading partner overall, individual European member states occupy only middle-tier positions in the continent’s investment landscape. European firms hold the largest stock of foreign investment in Africa, exceeding 250 billion euros, yet that dominance masks a troubling trend: only 10 percent of all new investment flowing to African companies in 2024 came from Europe. China and Gulf Arab states, by contrast, have deployed state-backed capital with strategic precision, building market share across multiple sectors and regions. On present trajectories, Europe’s share will continue to shrink.
The composition of European investment reveals another vulnerability. In 2025, 70 percent of EU imports from Africa consisted of primary products, with manufactured goods accounting for just 28 percent. France and Italy follow the same extractive pattern, concentrating capital in Africa’s extractive industries rather than manufacturing. This reflects a fundamental mismatch between what Africa needs for industrial development and what European investors are willing to finance. Greenfield manufacturing projects, regional infrastructure and integrated industrial ecosystems do far more to build productive capacity than capital alone, yet manufacturing receives only modest investment.
The reason lies in how investors assess risk. Capital is expensive in Africa because investors perceive the continent as disproportionately risky, pushing money toward asset-backed extractive ventures rather than the long-term commitments manufacturing requires. Africa’s own 4 trillion dollar domestic capital base sits largely idle, trapped in weak banking systems and cautious institutions that channel funds into short-term holdings and government debt instead of productive long-term investment.
France and Italy have begun tackling these structural problems through their overhauled strategies. Both countries used their G7 presidencies (in 2024 and 2026 respectively) to position Africa within a broader economic security agenda built on private capital mobilisation rather than traditional aid. Italy’s flagship Mattei Plan commits 5.5 billion euros in public funds over four years, from 2024 to 2027, but uses guarantees and development finance to unlock far larger sums. Italy’s export credit agency, SACE, has already deployed 4 billion euros in guarantees since the plan’s launch, pulling in an estimated 18.5 billion euros of private investment. International partners including the African Development Bank, the World Bank and the UAE add further capital to the equation.
France’s Africa Forward strategy operates within a broader 23 billion euro package, split between a 14 billion euro pledge from Paris and 9 billion euros from African partners. Just 1.94 billion euros represents public funds; the remainder is private capital. The strategy emphasises African strategic autonomy in food and digital technology, relying on small businesses, private investors and risk-mitigation instruments such as the African Trade and Investment Development Insurance.
Meanwhile, structured European collaboration remains sparse. A handful of joint initiatives exist, including collaboration between Italian, French and German state development banks on a water infrastructure project in Morocco under the Mattei Plan, and Denmark’s support for the Italy-African Development Bank Mattei Plan financing facility. Rome and Paris find it easier to build coalitions with international lenders and non-European partners than with each other, a dynamic that limits opportunities to pool resources and build larger industrial investment platforms.
For Europe to compete effectively, three strategic shifts are essential. Member states must pool guarantees and coordinate development finance institutions to change the risk calculus for investors. Joint mechanisms involving institutions such as Italy’s Cassa Depositi e Prestiti, France’s Agence Française de Développement, the European Investment Bank and African financial institutions would reassure private capital far more than fragmented national commitments. Europe must also think in terms of regional corridors rather than individual countries or sectors, since industrialisation crosses borders and requires integrated energy systems, transport connectivity, customs coordination and labour mobility. The Lobito Corridor, a planned rail line linking Congolese and Zambian mines to Angola’s Atlantic coast and backed by America, the EU and Italy, exemplifies this potential but remains incomplete in its integration of infrastructure, investment and regional coordination. Finally, Europe should use platforms such as the G7 and upcoming G20 presidencies to reshape the global investment environment itself, supporting the African Credit Rating Agency, expanding multilateral guarantees and reducing the cost of capital for African economies.
France and Italy have demonstrated that Europe can adapt. The harder question is whether separate national efforts can be woven into a coherent system before rivals with deeper coordination and longer time horizons make that task irrelevant.