Fatalities tied to militant Islamist violence in Africa have surged nearly 60 percent since 2021, pushing total deaths over 150,000. This comprehensive report explores regional trends, actors, and implications
Africa has now endured more than 150,000 fatalities linked to militant Islamist violence in Africa over the past decade—a staggering milestone that reflects a dramatic escalation in extremist activity. Since 2021, deaths tied to jihadist groups have climbed nearly 60 percent, with the Sahel and Somalia featuring as epicenters. This article examines the drivers, regional breakdowns, evolving militant networks, civilian suffering, displacement, and future trajectories—all under a unified narrative optimized for clarity and search visibility on “militant Islamist violence in Africa.”
Starting in 2021, the continent saw a sharp uptick in militant Islamist violence in Africa. Estimated fatalities rose by nearly 60 percent continent‑wide, hitting over 155,000 deaths by mid‑2025. The upward trajectory shows little sign of abating, despite regional fluctuations. Nearly three quarters of those fatalities have occurred since 2021, underscoring a recent acceleration in both frequency and lethality.
This rise is not uniform: some regions witnessed massive surges, others modest declines or stabilization. Yet the overall pattern is there—more violent events, more fatalities, more civilian targeting, and more displacement across large swathes of Africa.
The Sahel remains by far the most lethal theater of militant Islamist violence in Africa. In 2024 alone, it accounted for around 10,400 deaths, representing more than half of all extremist-linked fatalities on the continent. Countries such as Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger dominate the count—with Burkina Faso responsible for over half of Sahel deaths in 2024.
Already plagued by coups and weak governance, the Sahel has become fertile ground for groups like Jama’at Nusrat al‑Islam wal Muslimeen (JNIM) and Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS). JNIM-linked factions (notably Macina Liberation Front and Ansaroul Islam) account for roughly 80–85 percent of fatalities in the Sahel. Since 2020, Sahel deaths linked to militant Islamists have more than doubled, with violent events rising by nearly 90 percent.
Of grave concern is the massive targeting of civilians: in 2024, roughly two‑thirds of extremist attacks in the region involved deliberate civilian killings. In some cases, government or allied security forces also committed abuses, significantly worsening insecurity and fueling recruitment by militant groups.
Somalia remains a core hotspot. Al Shabaab, the long‑standing al‑Qaeda affiliate, has intensified its operations—especially after a nationwide counteroffensive beginning late 2023 and 2024 failed to dislodge the group. In the latest annual period, around 7,300 deaths in Somalia were attributed to militant Islamist violence, amounting to about one‑third of continental fatalities.
Battle‑related deaths dominate in Somalia—over 70 percent of fatalities result from armed clashes, compared with a much lower proportion of civilian-targeted killings. Meanwhile, Islamic State Somalia (ISS), though smaller, has grown to an estimated 1,000–1,200 fighters by early 2025, enhancing fundraising, recruiting foreign fighters, and amplifying the broader threat.
The Lake Chad Basin—including Nigeria’s northeast, Cameroon, Chad, and Niger—accounts for roughly 18–19 percent of Africa’s militant Islamist‑linked deaths. In 2024–25, the region experienced a modest rise in fatalities, with Boko Haram and Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWA) operating in densely hit zones like Borno State (Nigeria). Both groups now deploy night‑vision devices and surveillance drones, increasing battlefield effectiveness.
Violence against civilians remains high: over 800 civilian deaths occurred, the highest since 2016. ISWA in particular carried out major assaults, including overrunning military bases. Cameroon, turning a corner, saw a slight decline in fatalities, while Chad witnessed one of its worst years for extremist violence in recent memory. An in-depth report by the Africa Center for Strategic Studies offers further analysis on how Boko Haram and ISWA continue to reshape the region’s security dynamics.
In northern Mozambique, militants linked to Ahl al‑Sunna wal Jama’a (ASWJ)—colloquially called “al‑Shabaab” locally—have significantly reduced their lethality. From a peak of over 2,000 deaths in 2021, fatalities declined to about 330 in 2024 following intervention by SADC and Rwandan forces. Despite the withdrawal of external forces mid‑2024, the group remains active—attacking gold mines, villages and logistics routes. Displacement continues, with nearly half a million people uprooted.
North Africa—dominated historically by Islamist insurgencies in Algeria and Egypt—has seen fatalities plunge to an average of about 30 per year. In 2024 only around 17 deaths occurred, concentrated in Algeria. However, authorities remain alert to returning fighters from Libya and Syria, which pose risks for renewed extremist networks taking root.
A common root of escalating militant Islamist violence in Africa is state fragility. Frequent coups in Mali, Burkina Faso, and Niger have dismantled democratic institutions and constrained press and humanitarian access—leading to systematic under-reporting but also creating voids militants exploit.
Militant networks have steadily carved out ungoverned territory. Across Africa, nearly 950,000 km²—equivalent to Tanzania—is believed to lie outside effective government control. This vacuum spans the central Sahel, parts of Somalia, and locations around Lake Chad.
Groups like al Shabaab in Somalia and ISWA now command impressive resources—ranging from taxation and piracy in Somalia (up to $200 million in annual revenue) to illicit gold mining and ransom in the Sahel and Lake Chad region. Many groups now use weaponized drones, night vision, remote explosive systems, and satellite equipment.
Targeted killings of civilians—especially along ethnic lines—remain central to extremist strategy. In Mali and Burkina Faso, Fulani communities are disproportionately victimized. This tactic reinforces narratives of state neglect and injustice, which militant groups exploit for recruitment and local legitimacy.
More than 3.5 million people have been displaced across impacted regions in recent years. Burkina Faso alone accounts for over 1.8 million internally displaced persons, followed by Mali and Niger. In Mozambique, nearly 461,000 remain displaced. The relentless violence seeds hunger, deprives communities of services, and heightens humanitarian crises.
Thousands of civilians endure not only direct extremist attacks but also abuses by security forces. Particularly in Mali and Burkina Faso, government or allied paramilitaries—such as Russian‑aligned units—have committed major atrocities. In some cases, civilians killed by uniformed forces outnumber those killed by militants.
Without significant shifts in security strategy, the Sahel likely remains the continent’s most lethal extremist zone. Militants continue expanding recruitment and logistical reach, while states struggle to regain territorial control.
Despite ongoing military campaigns, al Shabaab remains entrenched in remote and rural areas. Gains by ISS add complexity to the threat landscape. Greater international support and integrated governance efforts are critical.
Countries such as Benin, Togo, and even Côte d’Ivoire face rising risks as militants push south from the Sahel. Cross‑border cooperation (e.g. the Accra Initiative) is vital to stem spread.
Militant groups now increasingly employ drones, remote‑detonation devices, encrypted communication, and night vision—enhancing lethality and making counter‑insurgency more complex.
The ongoing conflicts threaten to entrench cycles of displacement, food insecurity, and community breakdown—impacting governance, development and regional stability.
The crisis of militant Islamist violence in Africa is both profound and accelerating. With over 150,000 fatalities recorded over the past decade—and nearly 60 percent more deaths since 2021—the continent faces a multidimensional security challenge. While the Sahel continues as the epicenter, Somalia and the Lake Chad Basin remain deadly theaters, and violence is increasingly spilling toward coastal nations.
Without integrated strategies—combining security, governance, community partnership, and transparency—the death toll, displacement, and regional instability are likely to deepen. Addressing this crisis demands coordinated regional responses, international support, and a sharp focus on preventing further radicalization and restoring state presence.
